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Non-Technical Summary
To cope with the international variety of tax systems, business managers,
economists and other groups interested in taxation demand condensed but so-
phisticated information on effective tax burdens associated with different tax
systems. Various quantitative approaches to calculate effective levels of capital
income taxation have been developed in economics and in business manage-
ment. The scope of this paper is to highlight the common themes of these ap-
proaches and to elaborate their ranges of application.
We present forward-looking approaches for measuring statutory and effective
tax burdens on capital income and define some properties of the measures
which appear to be useful for the investigation and communication of effective
tax burdens. We compare the measures of effective marginal and effective aver-
age tax burdens, and we compare different types of approaches based on model
firms or on neoclassical investment theory.
We show the connections between the traditional approach for measuring ef-
fective marginal tax burdens by King/ Fullerton and a more recent approach
which also permits the calculation of effective average tax burdens by De-
vereux/ Griffith. A strong bridge between both approaches can be established by
slightly redefining Devereux/ Griffith’s measure.
The purpose of these comparisons is to evaluate the different measures and ap-
proaches with respect to their usefulness for investigating the effects of taxation
on decision-making, competition, and distributional aspects. In fact, the variety
of instruments permits a broad coverage of economic issues. However, not all
approaches are equally suited for all problems. It is necessary to reveal the
scope of the measurement and to carefully choose the right measure and ap-
proach.
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Abstract
Economic agents who face the diversity of tax systems demand condensed but
sophisticated information on effective tax burdens. We analyse common fea-
tures and differences between important forward-looking concepts of measuring
effective tax rates in business management and economics and develop some
useful properties for analysing and communicating them. We explore how the
instruments can be employed to provide information on the impact of taxation
on decision-making, competition, and distribution. The large variety of instru-
ments proves very useful. However, it turns out to be necessary to reveal the
measurement’s scope and to carefully choose the adequate approach and meas-
ure.
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11 Introduction
While markets become more and more global, tax systems stay local, and there
is an increasing diversity of tax systems that are relevant for economic agents
who decide on investments or compete in international markets. To cope with
this variety, business managers, economists and other groups interested in taxa-
tion, especially those who make and review tax systems, demand condensed but
sophisticated information on effective tax burdens associated with different tax
systems.
There are various quantitative approaches to calculate effective levels of taxa-
tion that have been developed in economics and in business management. The
scope of this paper is to highlight the common themes of these approaches and
to elaborate their ranges of application.
To sharpen the focus of our analysis, we restrict our investigation to the taxation
of business capital.1 Furthermore, as we are especially interested in the effects
of taxation on firm behaviour and future performance, we will focus on for-
ward-looking indicators of effective tax burdens. By comparing these ap-
proaches, we will refer to some core models, which do not take into account a
number of economic issues, e.g. effects of inflation or aspects of uncertainty.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Starting off from an analysis of the ad-
dressees and the objectives of tax burden comparisons, we briefly review the
most important economic aspects connected with taxation. These are decision-
making, competition, and distributional issues (section 2).
In section 3, we present approaches for measuring statutory and effective tax
burdens. We concentrate on forward-looking approaches and define some prop-
erties of the measures which appear to be useful for the investigation and com-
munication of effective tax burdens. Depending on the scope of the measure-
ment, we further define alternative dimensions of investigation, which might
help to shed light on different economic issues.
Section 4 goes into the details of the most important forward-looking ap-
proaches. We compare the measures of effective marginal and effective average
tax burdens, and we compare different types of approaches based on model
firms or on neoclassical investment theory. We show the connections between
                                                                                             
1 Thus we do not consider business taxation as a whole, which, for example, would also include the
taxation of entrepreneurial labour. Furthermore, we do not consider the impact of taxation on saving
decisions.
2the traditional approach for measuring effective marginal tax burdens by King/
Fullerton and a more recent approach which also permits the calculation of ef-
fective average tax burdens by Devereux/ Griffith. A strong bridge between
both approaches can be established by slightly redefining Devereux/ Griffith’s
measure. The purpose of these comparisons is to evaluate the different measures
and approaches with respect to their usefulness for investigating the economic
issues mentioned in section 2. In fact, the variety of instruments permits a broad
coverage of economic issues. However, it is necessary to reveal the scope of the
measurement and to carefully choose the right measure and approach.
Section 5 finally summarises the most important results.
2 Objectives of Measuring Effective Tax Burdens with Respect to Eco-
nomic Issues
2.1 Addressees of Tax Burden Comparisons
For measuring effective tax burdens, it is necessary to know the scope and the
purpose of the measurement.2 These are crucially related to who the addressees
of the tax burden comparison are. Three categories of addressees can be deemed
particularly relevant here:
First, business managers might be interested in effective tax burdens. Taxation
has a negative impact on cash flows and profits, i.e. taxation is relevant for the
determination of post-tax results. More importantly, taxation might change the
ranking of different alternatives, i.e. it is relevant for decision-making. Business
managers might increase post-tax performance by considering different levels
of taxation on different decision alternatives.3 Thus, for business managers,
post-tax results are especially important as they give advice on which alterna-
tive to choose.
Second, economists are interested in effective tax burdens. Their objective is to
show potential economic inefficiencies that arise when taxation comes at an ad-
ditional welfare cost. This occurs when decisions are distorted by taxation.
Then, pre-tax income in case taxes were not considered might be greater than
the sum of post-tax income and the amount of taxes collected if taxes were con-
sidered in decision-making.
                                                                                             
2 See Schneider (1992), p. 186.
3 See Georgi (1994), p. 4.
3In order to be able to analyse these issues, economists must predict the decision
behaviour of economic agents, in this case business managers. Therefore, their
approaches have to consider models used for managerial decision-making.
However, compared with business managers, economists are more interested in
pre-tax income after taxes have been considered than in post-tax income. This is
because differences in pre-tax income due to taxation in general constitute wel-
fare losses.
The economic analysis of taxation is not an end in itself. Thus the third impor-
tant group that is interested in effective tax burdens and that is supplied with
information by economists and by business managers consists of politicians,
law professionals, i.e., those who make and review political decisions on tax
systems, and last but not least the general public that has to evaluate tax systems
in a democratic society.
If politicians acted to maximise social welfare, they would consider economic
distortions due to tax legislation. Analyses of effective tax burdens in those
cases might be useful to detect these distortions and to define and evaluate al-
ternative legislation which might reduce them and thus might improve welfare.
2.2 Economic Issues Considered
From an economic perspective, the focus of the evaluation of tax regimes lies
on three issues: decision-making, competition, and distributional issues.
2.2.1 Decision-making
At the core of decision-making there is the perspective of a single person, i.e.,
the person of the decider is fixed and the tax burden on different alternatives is
considered. Taxation has an impact on decision-making if the ranking of the
alternatives before and after taking taxes into account is different. The most im-
portant decisions with respect to business capital are investment decisions,
which include location decisions, and financing decisions.
Investment decisions concern the decision of how to transform financial funds
into (real) capital. Taxation does not influence investment decisions if it does
not affect the ranking of different projects. Depending on the type of investment
choice, this might have different implications.
4From the point of view of a business manager, many investment decisions ex-
hibit a discrete, mutually exclusive character and earn more than the minimum
expected return. When facing a choice of alternatives, firms will realise only the
investment with the greatest post-tax value. If performance is measured by net
present values, investment decisions are not affected by taxation if4
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are satisfied for all investment alternatives A, B, where NPV and NPVt denote
the pre-tax and post-tax net present values, respectively.
In other cases, decisions might have a non-discrete character. If a manager has
relatively free access to capital markets and the capital stock can be varied arbi-
trarily, under the assumption of a decreasing marginal product of capital it is
optimal to invest up to the point where additional investments earn exactly the
minimum rate of return accepted by the shareholders. Formally, neutrality with
respect to decision-making implies that
NPV = 0  NPVt = 0 for all investments. (3)
Knowing about effective tax burdens of alternative investments is important for
business managers to maximise shareholder value. Under a neutral tax system,
there is no need to take tax issues into account. Realising the project with the
highest pre-tax income would also maximise shareholder value.
From the point of view of an economist, the main goal of tax neutrality with re-
spect to investment decisions is to ensure production efficiency. It should not be
possible to reallocate capital between investments to raise pre-tax income of the
economy or the world. Production efficiency is satisfied if the pre-tax marginal
rate of return is equal across all investments and, with respect to discrete in-
vestment choices, those inframarginal investments which earn the highest pre-
tax yield are undertaken.
One especially relevant type of investment decision is the location decision. Ef-
fective tax burdens often differ substantially between jurisdictions as tax codes
                                                                                             
4 The first of the two conditions would be sufficient to ensure an efficient allocation. By adding the
second condition, it is secured that equal pre-tax net present values imply equal post-tax net present
values. If there are no externalities, the combination of these two conditions is only important for an
economic agent who is interested in maximising post-tax results, but not for an economist, as both
alternatives are equally favourable before taxes.
5are set nationally. Often, a firm going abroad expects to earn an economic rent,5
and the location decision can be assumed to be of the discrete type mentioned
above.6
Such an economic rent can be split into two components that might also appear
in combination: (1) A firm-specific economic rent. An example might be the
case of an international patent. (2) An economic rent that is tied to a specific
location. An extreme case would be mining or petroleum exploration. Also,
such an economic rent might be generated by a highly developed infrastructure
which is offered by a particular location.7
Assume that a corporation has the opportunity of locating a manufacturing plant
in the EU-countries A or B or alternatively in the non-EU-country C. The eco-
nomic rent associated with these investments would be 12 (A), 10 (B), and 5
(C). The firm-specific rent is 5, the EU-wide economic rent is 5, and the eco-
nomic rent of manufacturing in country A is 2. Theoretically, country A could
levy a tax on the economic rent of very close to 2, the EU or country A and B
jointly could levy a tax of very close to 5, and C could not levy any tax unless A
or B overtaxed their part of the economic rent. Then, an economic inefficiency
would result if the corporation settled in any country but country A and the lo-
cation-specific economic rent could not be offered to any other company, i.e., it
is lost for the whole world. Thus the location-specific part of the economic rent
can theoretically be almost fully captured by taxation without any welfare loss.
E.g., a country that offers an infrastructure that is more favourable from the
point of view of a company might be able to demand higher taxes. In contrast,
under unlimited tax competition the mobile part of the rent cannot be taxed.
Governments might employ a tax system that exclusively taxes economic rents,
like the cash flow tax or a tax based on an allowance for corporate equity
(ACE). Their dilemma is, however, that for practical reasons or legal require-
ments they often cannot differentiate between mobile and location-specific
rents. A business manager deciding on where to locate a business would choose
the location that offers him the highest post-tax economic rent, regardless of its
                                                                                             
5 See Richter/ Seitz/ Wiegard (1996), p. 19; Bond (2000), p. 171; Devereux (2000), p. 113. For a brief
review of the particular economic conditions for an environment that enhances the activities of multi-
national enterprises, see Markusen (1995), who especially discusses Dunning’s OLI (ownership-
location-internalisation)-framework.
6 See Devereux/ Griffith (1998), p. 337; Devereux/ Griffith (1999), pp. 7-11.
7 See Richter/ Seitz/ Wiegard (1996).
6composition. Tax systems that place a heavy burden on economic rents might
thus deter investment in that country.
Location decisions can also exhibit the non-discrete character, when e.g. a
firm’s or the economy’s capital stock is adjusted to the optimum in each coun-
try.
However, decisions that might appear to be discrete from the point of view of
business management, e.g. due to indivisibility, might be non-discrete from the
point of view of the whole economy, as in the aggregate there might be effects
on the marginal productivity of a whole economy even if a single investor
would not realise this for his decision. Also, as different mechanisms might
drive the marginal product of a single firm compared with a whole economy, the
implications of taxation might be different from the perspective of a single firm
compared with the perspective of the whole economy.
Financing decisions concern the choice of obtaining funds for an investment.
Typically, three sources of finance are considered: retained earnings, new eq-
uity, and debt. Financing decisions can be internal or external, depending on
whether the decider is the one who also supplies the funds (e.g. financing inside
a group of companies, or financing of a closely held partnership by the partner)
or not. Taking a broader view of this decision, also the choice of the organisa-
tional form of an investment is a financing decision as it determines the legal
character of the equity supplied.
From a business management point of view, financing decisions are in some
respect not very different from investment decisions, only the sign of the first
payment is positive, whereas for investment decisions it is negative.8 Choosing
a tax-favoured way of financing the company may boost shareholder value the
same way as choosing a tax-favoured investment.
From an economic point of view, there are three important positions on whether
distortions to the financing decision are harmful or not. Some argue that distor-
tions might improve social welfare as undistorted financing decisions are driven
by external effects and thus need a correction9, which might be implemented by
the tax system. Others argue that undistorted financing decisions perform better
in maximising social welfare than distorted ones. A third important opinion is
                                                                                             
8 See Hållsten (1966), pp. 17-18; Schneider (1992), p. 21.
9 For example Schneider (2002), p. 175, argues in favour of adjusting tax burdens to take into account
different risk positions associated with different sources of finance.
7that a distortion of financing decisions does not matter as long as different
sources of finance are close substitutes. It has been noted that distortions of real
investment decisions might be reduced in case there is one source of finance
which is neutrally taxed; this might act as a “buffer”10.
To conclude, a complete picture of distortions of investment decisions cannot
be drawn without considering alternative financing decisions.
2.2.2 Competition
In contrast to decision-making, an analysis of distortions to competition cannot
observe the economy from the point of view of a single agent. It has to rely on
the comparison of the situation of at least two competing agents.
Competition is distorted if any agent who is more or similarly competitive than
one of his or her rivals before taxes are taken into account will be less competi-
tive after taxes. Competitiveness can be tied to the instruments of competition
between businesses, which may be prices or product quality.11 As product qual-
ity is difficult to measure, we assume comparable products and only price com-
petition. As long as an economic rent is earned, the business might reduce
prices until the economic rent earned is zero. The tax system discriminates
against a competitor who ceteris paribus requires a greater price for the same
product than his rival.
Issues of competitiveness are closely connected to decision issues. It is impor-
tant to find out the most tax-efficient way of structuring and financing the in-
vestment in a first stage, i.e. to undertake some tax optimisation, to find the
lowest acceptable price for each competitor. Also, competition issues might
prevent a firm from taking on business. Thus it might predetermine the decision
to enter a specific market.
To optimise their strategies for serving particular markets, business managers
should take into account the effects of taxation on their own and their rivals’
competitiveness. Economists might point out welfare losses if these effects de-
terred a more efficient company from serving a market.
                                                                                             
10 Sinn (1987), p. 181.
11 See Maiterth (2001) p. 102.
82.2.3 Distributional Aspects
The distributional aspects of taxation are in the centre of a number of economic
studies.12 It is, however, very difficult to find out the impact of taxation on the
relative well-being of individuals. Also, it is difficult to formulate a normative
statement on how or whether at all taxes should affect distribution. Therefore,
we will restrict our study to only a few remarks on the usefulness of the tax bur-
den measures presented for distributional analyses.
3 Approaches for Measuring Effective Tax Burdens
3.1 Backward- Versus Forward-Looking Measures
For measuring tax burdens, a number of different instruments exist.13
First, there are comparisons of statutory tax rates. These measures only consider
the interrelations of headline tax rates. Differences in the definition of tax bases
cannot be considered. These comparisons can be very informative, as the head-
line tax rate is an important parameter of a tax system,14 but they cannot be clas-
sified as “effective” tax rates. An effective tax rate would be based not on tax-
able profit as defined by law but on an economic measure and thus would also
consider the impact of the tax base.
Turning towards effective tax rates, there are, second, backward-looking meas-
ures. These can be calculated from firm data or macroeconomic data. Tax pay-
ments from national or firm accounts are based on some measure of profit or
operating surplus reported by companies. Besides a number of detailed prob-
lems regarding the consistency of the data used in the numerator and the de-
nominator of the measure and regarding the international comparability of the
employed data,15 these measures are conceptually not suited to evaluate the ef-
fects of taxation on business decision-making. Decisions are based on the future
tax burdens connected with a particular decision. Backward-looking effective
                                                                                             
12 For a recent extensive review of studies on tax incidence, see Fullerton/ Metcalf (2002).
13 See Jacobs/ Spengel (2000); OECD (2000); Spengel/ Lammersen (2001), pp. 223-225.
14 The headline tax rate is so important because it determines the value of profit-shifting opportunities,
because it shows the tax burden on an additional unit of profit and also because it might be a strong
signal for potential investors who cannot judge the impact of other components of the tax system
without deeper investigations.
15 See OECD (2001), pp. 7, 11.
9tax burdens can usually not be connected to a particular decision, and it is not
possible to identify the so-called “tax-drivers” by relying on backward-looking
measures. They are not connected to future tax payments either. For similar rea-
sons, they cannot give information on the impact of taxation on future competi-
tiveness of firms.
If applied carefully, backward-looking measures, however, can be useful for ex-
post analyses on who paid the taxes in an economy, which might be an indicator
for distributional aspects of a tax system. Also, backward-looking measures are
sometimes used in business management to evaluate the ex-post performance of
company tax departments.16
Thus we have to turn towards the third category of tax burden measures: for-
ward-looking measures. These take into consideration expected tax payments
associated with particular decisions. Thus they are potentially suited for esti-
mating the effects of taxation on business decision-making.
These measures are used in economics as well as in business management; in
the past, however, different approaches have been preferred in both disciplines.
Business management often relied on more or less detailed model-firm ap-
proaches. Economic studies, by contrast, employed models based on neoclassi-
cal investment theory. Both types of approaches are based on measures of eco-
nomic performance. We briefly review these measures before turning towards a
closer look at the approaches.
3.2 Measures of Economic Performance
To measure expected economic performance, a number of economic values can
be constructed. In general, these are cash flow-based measures that serve as a
starting point for measuring the impact of taxation on these economic goal vari-
ables. The most important concepts for measuring expected economic perform-
ance are rates of return and net present values.
We define rates of return in a broad sense to cover all measures that tie the in-
come generated by a project to the amount invested. These might be internal
rates of return, growth rates, or one-period rates of return. Rates of return are a
reliable and intuitively comprehensible measure of performance. They are de-
                                                                                             
16 See Herzig/ Dempfle (2002), pp. 1, 8.
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fined relative to the capital invested.17 In contrast to the second important per-
formance measures, net present values, rates of return are not defined relative to
an alternative that also generates positive returns.
Net present values denote the minimum amount an investor would expect in
turn for giving up a particular investment opportunity. They are driven by the
cash flows generated by the investment project considered, but also by the op-
portunity cost of the investor. If we assume the alternative use of funds to be a
bank deposit at the single market interest rate, a cash flow tax does not change
the opportunity cost of an investment as it leaves interest income effectively
untaxed. Thus it cuts net present values proportionally. A neutral comprehen-
sive income tax following the outlines laid by Johansson and Samuelson, which
taxes interest at the statutory rate and where allowances are based on the decline
of the earnings capacity value of the investment, however, leaves valuations and
thus net present values unchanged.18 The effects of taxation on the income gen-
erated from the investment and those on the opportunity cost exactly cancel out.
Although there is a positive present value of tax payments, the effective tax
burden displayed by the difference of pre-tax and post-tax net present values is
zero.
There are more performance measures, e.g. final values, which can be used for
tax burden comparisons, but which are not directly addressed here as they are
not very common and as their properties are more or less comparable to those of
the two types of measures mentioned above.
Rates of return and net present values are measures of profitability. However,
both decision-making and competitiveness might also depend on liquidity as-
pects. These aspects could, for example, enter the considerations as a side con-
dition, i.e. the strategy could be to maximise profitability and to take care of a
minimum liquidity in each of the periods.
3.3 Useful Properties of Effective Tax Burden Measures
In order to measure effective tax burdens related to a future project, one needs
to analyse the tax-induced change in the goal variable of the decider. To trans-
                                                                                             
17 Here we focus on rates of return based on the return to assets. Rates of return might also be based
on equity invested. That approach, however, might mask tax effects. E.g., under a cash flow tax the
private rate of return is not affected: The equity invested and the proceedings are cut by the same rate.
18 See Johansson (1961), pp. 211-216, and (1969); Samuelson (1964).
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late this change into an effective tax rate, usually the difference between the
post-tax and the pre-tax value of the goal variable is divided by the pre-tax
value. By proceeding this way, consistency and interpretability of effective tax
rates can be promoted since the measure will potentially exhibit some very use-
ful properties.
(1) The most important property of decision-based effective tax rates is of an
ordinal nature: Higher (lower) effective tax rates should indicate less (more)
favoured alternatives, equal effective tax rates should indicate indifference.
If this were not the case, an effective tax rate would not be able to predict
decision behaviour.
(2) Second, it is useful to rely on a zero point which indicates investment neu-
trality with respect to the standard alternative. For marginal investments, this
standard alternative is considered in the calculation of the discount rate and
is usually a standard financial asset which yields the market interest rate. A
particular value of the effective tax rate should indicate neutrality between
the investment and this alternative, thus for a whole tax system to be neutral,
the effective tax rate on each equally favourable alternative should equal this
benchmark effective tax rate. The importance of this standard alternative is
based on the fact that it is compared to every investment in the whole econ-
omy. Deviations in the effective tax rate from this benchmark thus permit to
state generally whether an alternative is tax-preferred or tax-disadvantaged.
(3) Third, the standard measure could be tied to an intuitively comprehensible
benchmark value. A good choice would be the well-known concept of the
statutory tax rate or the fraction of tax that would be taken from the income
generated by a one-period investment.19 An effective tax rate below this
value would indicate that an alternative is favoured by the tax system, possi-
bly due to an especially generous definition of the tax base or a special, fa-
vourable interplay of statutory tax rates of different tax types (e.g. the corpo-
rate tax system, i.e. the integration between corporate and personal taxes).20
                                                                                             
19 This might be relevant e.g. for a tax based on an allowance for corporate equity. Under an interest
rate of 5 % and a statutory tax rate of 40 %, an investment of 1,000 which generates a return of 100
would be expected to pay 20 (20 %) in taxes, whereas if the return was only 50 the tax burden would
be zero (0 %), both indicating the proper implementation of this neutral tax system.
20 This has been noted by Schneider, see, for example, Schneider (2002), pp. 112-113.
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This promotes the communication and the widespread use of a concept of ef-
fective tax rates.21
(4) Fourth, to fully exploit the advantages laid out in properties (1) to (3), an
effective tax rate that deviates from the benchmark value could also be con-
nected in some way to the concept that delivered this value. For example, if
it was based on the statutory tax rate, an effective tax rate that deviated from
the statutory tax rate by, say, 5 percentage points due to a generous defini-
tion of the tax base would be equivalent to a 5 percentage point reduction in
the statutory tax rate under neutral depreciation rules.
Obviously, as decision-making and competition always consider the ranking of
alternative projects, and as property (1) is sufficient to show the impact of taxa-
tion on these projects, only property (1) is required to obtain valid results. Prop-
erties (2) to (4), however, appear to be very useful to promote the use of a con-
cept of effective tax rates.
First, they make them comprehensible also to those who are non-specialists in
tax burden comparisons, especially to the third group mentioned in section 2.1,
i.e. those who make and review tax systems.
Second, the most important insights tax burden comparisons can generate are
those that help identifying and analysing the tax drivers, i.e. that promote logi-
cal conclusions about the impact of different components of a tax system. The
properties shown above permit more general conclusions on whether a tax sys-
tem treats alternatives and firms systematically equal, and they help evaluating
the sources and the sizes of an unequal treatment.
3.4 Dimensions of Investigation
3.4.1 Type and Level of Profitability of the Unit Regarded
A first dimension of investigation of effective tax burdens considers the type
and the level of profitability of the unit regarded. The investment considered
might be (1) a whole business, or (2) an additional business or investment unit
for an existing business. From the point of view of business administration, in
the standard case a whole business unit is assumed to be profitable and earns an
                                                                                             
21 E.g. business managers rely on ex post measures of performance of their tax departments that are
based on company tax quotas, where a tax quota below some (weighted) statutory tax rate might indi-
cate a good performance.
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economic rent. This does not need to be the case for an additional unit. Thus an
additional unit might be (2a) an additional project that earns an economic rent
or (2b) the last unit of investment that is worthwhile to be undertaken and thus
marginal in an economic sense.
As for the effective tax burdens on these different types of investment some-
times the same terms are used in literature, there is potential for confusion.22 To
avoid confusion, we will use the term ‘marginal’ for investments that are mar-
ginal in the economic sense and the term ‘effective marginal tax rate’ (EMTR)
for the effective tax rate on post-tax marginal investments, as opposed to ‘aver-
age’ and ‘effective average tax rate’ (EATR) for inframarginal investments.
3.4.2 Shareholder Taxation
A second dimension of investigation asks whether shareholder taxation should
be included. Usually, shareholder taxation is personal taxation, as the ultimate
shareholder of a company always is an individual. However, a group of compa-
nies might be organised in a multi-level structure, thus for a two-tier corpora-
tion, three levels of taxation exist: taxation at the level of the subsidiary, taxa-
tion at the level of the corporate group, and taxation at the so-called overall
level consisting of the group of companies and its ultimate shareholders.
With respect to the question which levels and which type of individual share-
holder should be included, a number of suggestions exist. To summarise this
discussion, there are good reasons to assume that shareholder taxation is less
important for business decisions the bigger the corporation in view is, the more
integrated international capital markets are, and the less shareholder taxation
discriminates between different alternatives. To capture most relevant cases,
however, usually a number of simulations assuming different ultimate share-
holders and different structures of the corporate group are undertaken. By ana-
lysing the sensitivity of the results with respect to these different structures,
                                                                                             
22 The term ‘effective marginal tax rate’ is used for the tax burden on investments that are marginal in
the sense of ‘additional’ (category (2) of the above) as well as for those that are marginal in an eco-
nomic sense (category (2b)). The ‘effective average tax rate’ is frequently used as the opposite of the
‘effective marginal tax rate’ and thus also serves for at least two different purposes: First, it denotes
the effective tax burden on a whole business unit (category (1) of the above) or, alternatively, on the
whole income of a person who decides and who bears the tax consequences. Second, it describes the
effective tax burden on projects that are inframarginal in an economic sense, i.e. that earn an eco-
nomic rent.
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analysts can gain a number of valuable insights into the tax drivers at different
levels of taxation.
3.4.3 Top-down Versus Bottom-up Approach
A third dimension of investigation considers the economic starting point of the
measurement of tax burdens. To isolate the effects of taxation, non-tax effects
on the favourability of investments have to be omitted. Then we can distinguish
between top-down or bottom-up analyses.
Top-down means that the alternatives under investigation are equal with respect
to their pre-tax rate of profitability p and might differ with respect to their post-
tax rate of return r. For profitable investments, this is equivalent to the assump-
tion that they earn the same economic rent before taxes are considered. This is
not necessarily true for the marginal case. By definition of the marginal invest-
ment, there is one degree of freedom less in changing parameters, as the mar-
ginal investment is a special case of all investments. Once the pre-tax rate of
return of the marginal investment p~  is set, another parameter is affected to se-
cure the post-tax marginality of the investment. This parameter usually is the
real market interest rate, which we denote by i.23
We obtain a fixed-p-case for the inframarginal case, where the post-tax rate of
return of the investment r depends on the pre-tax rate of return of the invest-
ment p and the tax system, and where the real market interest rate i is exoge-
nous. And we obtain a fixed- p~ -case24 for marginal investments, where r is
equal to the minimum post-tax rate of return demanded by the shareholder s so
that the net present value of the investment R = 0 and i is endogenous.
Bottom-up means that a given post-tax value is assumed and the corresponding
pre-tax value is calculated. Theoretically, this bottom-up process can start off
from any of the levels mentioned in section 3.4.2. For inframarginal invest-
ments, an expected post-tax economic rent can be defined and the correspond-
ing pre-tax economic rent can be calculated. For marginal investments, the real
market interest rate i (fixed-i-case25) or the post-tax rates of return r (fixed-r-
                                                                                             
23 The standard notation for this parameter is r, however, we choose the notation i to avoid confusion
with the more general post-tax rate of return to the shareholder r.
24 The “fixed-p-case“ in terms of King/ Fullerton (1984). We have changed the expression to match
the notation of this paper.
25 The “fixed-r-case“ in terms of King/ Fullerton (1984).
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case) for the shareholder are equalised, and the pre-tax rate of return required to
generate this minimum accepted post-tax rate is calculated.
The choice between top-down or bottom-up calculations is not easy. Business
managers might prefer the fixed-p-case when deciding about inframarginal, dis-
crete investment choices that are equal from their point of view before taxes are
taken into account. They might be tempted to do so also for the marginal case,
but this would imply a variation in the market interest rate, which is not con-
vincing from the point of view of a business manager, who acts as a price taker
with respect to the market interest rate.
Economists typically rely on arbitrage assumptions to argue in favour of the
fixed-i-case or the fixed- p~ -case.26 These arbitrage assumptions are very im-
portant as they imply where taxes can be effectively shifted, i.e., who bears the
burden of a tax.
4 Comparison of Forward-Looking Measures and Approaches
4.1 Models Based on Neoclassical Investment Theory
By relying on an approach based on neoclassical investment theory,
King/ Fullerton (1984) were the first who broadly computed effective marginal
tax rates on investment in a number of countries. Their model became standard
in international tax burden comparisons.27 The King/ Fullerton (KF) approach is
based on the assumption of an everlasting one unit increase of the capital stock.
Under consideration of taxation, the pre-tax rate of return that is necessary to
satisfy the minimum requirements by the shareholders is calculated. The differ-
ence between this rate of return p~ , the so-called cost of capital, and the mar-
ginal post-tax rate of return to the shareholder s is the tax wedge, and this
wedge divided by the cost of capital is the effective marginal tax rate EMTR:
p
spEMTR ~
~

 . (4)
                                                                                             
26 See King/ Fullerton (1984), pp. 11-12; OECD (1991), pp. 89-90; for a critical view, see Claassen
(1994), pp. 97-100.
27 For some early and some more recent and extensive studies based on this framework, see OECD
(1991); European Commission (1992); Chennells/ Griffith (1997); Caron & Stevens/ Baker &
McKenzie (1999); Hugounenq/ Le Cacheux/ Madiès (1999); Spengel (1999); Winner (2000); Baker &
McKenzie (2001); Gutekunst/ Schwager (2002).
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The calculations are based on a very simple model cash flow. Thus the whole
basic model is very compact and can be expressed by a few formulas.
To concentrate on conceptual issues, we will focus on the fixed-i-case and ana-
lyse a very basic model which only takes into account the most important pa-
rameters and assumes price stability.28 For the tax system, we consider the
statutory tax rate on corporate profits , the rate of imputation tied to a dividend
c, the personal income tax rates on interest payments mi, dividends md, and
capital gains on the disposal of shares z, and a declining balance depreciation
rate at . As economic parameters, we consider the real market interest rate i
and the rate of economic depreciation . We regard the cases of an investment
that is financed by retained earnings (RE), new equity (NE), or debt (D).
Then, the model can be specified by29
s = (1 – mi)  i; (5)






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1
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denoting the present value of the tax savings due to declining balance deprecia-
tion allowances and
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

 ; (9)
iDKF  )1(  ; (10)
denoting the discount rate KF for the each of the three different sources of fi-
nance.
                                                                                             
28 For the model, see King/ Fullerton (1984), pp. 7-30. However, in contrast to King/ Fullerton we use
a discrete time approach. Such an approach has also been applied by OECD (1991) and European
Commission (1992).
29 Readers interested in details on the derivation and the interpretation of the formulas are referred to
King/ Fullerton (1984), pp. 7-30.
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The EMTR is equal to the statutory tax rate when a comprehensive income tax
system which is neutral with respect to the investment decision is supposed and
personal taxes are included. If, on contrary, a consumption-based system such
as a cash flow tax or an ACE-tax is supposed, the EMTR indicating investment
neutrality would be zero.30
In 1998, Devereux and Griffith (DG) presented a model for computing effective
marginal as well as effective average tax rates that is also based on neoclassical
investment theory and builds on the King/ Fullerton approach.31 The model has
been applied in two studies evaluating the German tax reform of the year 200032
and in an extensive study on the effective levels of company taxation in the
member states of the European Union33.
As with the King/ Fullerton approach, again an incremental investment of one
unit to the capital stock of a firm is assumed. In contrast to the former approach,
this increment is reversed after one period. Also in opposition to the King/
Fullerton approach, the additional investment might earn an economic rent.
An effective average tax rate based on net present values EATRR can be defined
as the difference between the pre-tax net present value R* and the post-tax net
present value R of the investment, divided by the present value of the income p
generated by the project and discounted at the pre-tax interest rate i:34
                                                                                             
30 See King/ Fullerton (1984), pp. 26-27; for effective marginal tax rates under a tax system based on
an allowance for corporate equity, see also Lammersen (1999), pp. 82-85, 87-111.
31 See Devereux/ Griffith (1999).
32 See Bond/ Chennells (2000); Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung (2001), sections 372-385, 527-553.
33 See Devereux/ Lammersen/ Spengel (2000); European Commission (2001).
34 See Devereux/ Griffith (1999), p. 20. The model presented here follows the one employed by
Schreiber/ Spengel/ Lammersen (2002) and is slightly different from the one presented by Devereux/
Griffith (1999). For details on the derivation and the interpretation of the formulas, see Devereux/
Griffith (1999), Devereux/ Griffith (2002), and Schreiber/ Spengel/ Lammersen (2002), pp. 6-13.
In short: The net present value computed by (13) consists of four parts. (1) The first summand in the
braces denotes the change in the value of dividends due to the retention of one unit of profits – and
due to the value of tax deductions from depreciation allowances   A. (2) The second summand con-
sists (a) of the post-tax value of the surplus   (p + )  (1 – ). Reinvestment at the end of the period
is reduced by (1 – ), which moreover reduces tax deductions due to depreciation allowances. Thus
(b) the second part of the second summand is   (1 – )  (1 – A). Both parts are discounted for one
period. (3) The third summand, F, adjusts this formula to take into account cash-flows associated with
external financing. Since distributions are the residual use of funds in the model, dividend payments
increase when external funds are raised by the corporation and decrease when they are redeemed and
when interest is paid. Expressions (17) and (18) take this into account. (4) The factor (1 – z) finally
takes into account an initial capital gains tax that is due in case of a positive net present value.
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The net present values under the basic economic framework mentioned above
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denoting a ratio which describes a discrimination factor between retained and
distributed earnings, (14)
)1(
)1(
z
imi


 (15)
denoting the discount rate of the shareholder and
0REF , (16)
)1(
)1(





NEF , (17)






1
)]1(1[ iF D , (18)
denoting the additional present value F of financing by retained earnings, new
equity, or debt.
With s and A being defined as in (5) and (7) and with  as defined in (15) as the
discount factor, for R = 0 an EMTR can be computed by (4) with a cost of capi-
tal of
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Additionally, an effective average tax rate based on rates of return can be cal-
culated:35
p
rpEATR p  , (20)
where the post-tax rate of return r is defined as
r = R  (1 + s) + s. (21)
With respect to the assumed model cash flow and the compactness of the for-
mulas, the approach is comparable with the one by King and Fullerton. This
becomes clearest when we compare the basic formulas for computing the effec-
tive marginal tax burdens. In fact, under a number of scenarios both expressions
are equivalent. They only differ with respect to how external sources of finance
are modelled in the calculation of the cost of capital. In the King/ Fullerton ap-
proach, this is taken into consideration by changing the discount rate , whereas
this rate is independent of the source of finance in the Devereux/ Griffith model,
and a parameter F is added to capture the present value of the one-period exter-
nal financing.
Consequently, in the basic model shown above the EMTR are the same regard-
less of the approach taken under a number of cases: For the expressions for the
cost of capital to be equal, it is sufficient to assume that the investment is fi-
nanced by retained earnings, or that there is a neutral depreciation schedule, or
that the corporate tax system satisfies some basic neutrality conditions. This is
shown in more detail in the appendix to this paper.
From the point of view of business management, the fact that the discount rate
does not depend on the source of finance of the corporation appears to be pref-
erable, as under the concept of shareholder value the discount rate is determined
by the alternative, non-corporate use of funds for the shareholder. This alterna-
tive use of funds is assumed to be a financial asset that yields the market interest
rate and is not affected by the way the corporation is financed. This particular
feature of the King/ Fullerton approach has already been criticised – inter alia
for these reasons – by Scott36 and Stellpflug37.
                                                                                             
35 For more details, see Schreiber/ Spengel/ Lammersen (2002), p. 11.
36 See Scott (1987), pp. 258-259.
37 See Stellpflug (2001), p. 116.
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Turning to the inframarginal case, the King/ Fullerton approach can no longer
be applied. With respect to the comparability of the EMTR and the EATR, the
EATRR developed by Devereux/ Griffith exhibits the shortcoming that it is based
on net present values, not on rates of return as the one defined by King and
Fullerton. However, for cases where only corporate taxes and dividend taxation
are considered, Devereux/ Griffith have shown that the EMTR calculated on ba-
sis of their approach is a special case of the EATRR, i.e. it is equal to the EATRR
of the marginal investment.38 Additionally, it can be shown that the EATRR is
equal to the EATRp when the discount rate  and the post-tax marginal rate of
return to the shareholder s are not affected. In this case, with mi = z = 0, what
implies that s =  = i, we obtain:39
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In cases where the concepts based on net present values and rates of return dif-
fer, the measures cannot be compared with the EMTR. However, it has been
shown that within this basic model, the EATRp for all parameter values is in fact
a weighted average of the EMTR and a combined statutory tax rate which takes
into account corporate taxation, dividend taxation and the taxation of capital
gains:40
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For p = p~   EATRp = EMTR, thus we have the striking result that the EMTR is
a special case of the EATRp and, with a view to the relationship between KFp~
and DGp~  shown above and in the appendix, the valuable property that for a
                                                                                             
38 See Devereux/ Griffith (1999), p. 21.
39 See Schreiber/ Spengel/ Lammersen (2002), p. 15.
40 For the EATRR, see Spengel/ Lammersen (2001), pp. 227-228; Devereux/ Griffith (2002), p. 11. For
the EATRp, see also Schreiber/ Spengel/ Lammersen (2002), p. 14, who also give a more detailed ex-
planation of the combined statutory rate mentioned. In short, the first two factors in the brackets en-
compass the combined corporate and personal tax rate on an additional unit of profits which is
deemed to be distributed immediately. The last factor encompasses the taxation of the capital gain that
arises due to an increased rate of profitability.
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number of basic cases the EATRp is a more general expression of the EMTR as
calculated by King/ Fullerton. The concept of the EATRp thus brings together
the concepts by King/ Fullerton and Devereux/ Griffith.
One unattractive feature of the Devereux/ Griffith approach is the great weight
that is given to dividend taxation when estimating the EATR. All proceedings
generated by the investment are assumed to be distributed immediately. This
might not be the optimal behaviour of an investor.41 However, the whole model
is not dealing with an endogenous optimisation of financial behaviour,42 and as
the three sources of finance at the beginning of the investment can be regarded
in isolation, the absence of an internal mechanism of optimisation does not ap-
pear to be a big shortcoming. Nevertheless, at the end of the investment, it
might be fruitful to isolate different strategies, i.e. uses of the funds generated.43
4.2 Model Firm Approach
Approaches based on model firms are especially common in business admini-
stration. They compute the consequences of taxation for particular projects in
detail for each period. The tax bases are modelled in great detail and under con-
sideration of liquidity effects.44 The tax assessment and the effect of taxes on
financial statements, liquidity calculations and profit and loss accounts are
simulated over a number of successive periods. Based on these simulations, pre-
sent values, final values, or effective rates of return are computed and compared
by their absolute values or in relation to corresponding pre-tax values. To
                                                                                             
41 If the tax burden on corporate financial assets was lower than the one on non-corporate financial
assets, an investor might increase wealth by accumulating funds inside the corporation. A first im-
pression on whether such an effect exists can be gained by comparing the EMTR of a corporate finan-
cial asset financed by retained earnings with the benchmark of the effective tax burden on a non-
corporate financial asset.
42 Computing effective tax rates and costs of capital under a dynamic framework requires a number of
additional assumptions; for some dynamic models, see Sinn (1987), Weichenrieder (1995).
43 With respect to taxes at the corporate level only (md = c = mi = z = 0), under most tax systems there
is no difference between retained and distributed earnings, and the accumulation at the shareholder
level is not regarded. Consequently, the implicit assumption of an immediate distribution is not rele-
vant. If shareholder taxation is included, and assuming that any surplus can be invested in financial
assets at the corporate level which yield the market interest rate, a modification of  by adjusting md
(and also of course c) might be a way of dealing with the issue. However, it might be very difficult to
implement this properly, i.e. in a way that is consistent with the framework of the model.
44 See Spengel (1995), pp. 159-203; Jacobs/ Spengel (1996), pp. 139-146, and (2000), pp. 339-340,
who refer especially to the “European Tax Analyzer“, a model firm approach developed by the Centre
for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim, and the University of Mannheim. For a recent
study based on this model, see European Commission (2001); Jacobs/ Spengel (2002).
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evaluate alternative projects or tax regimes, model firms with comparable char-
acteristics are assessed under a number of different tax rules to investigate the
differences in the tax burdens and to find out the most tax-preferred alternative.
In general, these instruments are applied for computing EATR only, although it
is conceivable to calculate EMTR as well. These effective tax rates might be
computed for an additional investment or for a whole business unit.
In addition to detailed model firm approaches, a number of particular studies on
effective tax burdens apply less detailed calculations. These models, which ex-
hibit a very partial character, might be applied to evaluate the tax consequences
of very special situations. Thus they also might include non-periodic tax bur-
dens, like the tax burden of a sale of the whole corporation or inheritance tax.
4.3 Comparison of Approaches
The used approaches show differences and similarities: In general, models
based on neoclassical investment theory can be characterised as highly simpli-
fied and restricted model firm approaches.45 The cash flows are determined in a
fashion that they can be expressed in a very compact formula. This highlights
the most important differences:
A model firm approach may contain an abundance of economic parameters,
which cannot or only under great efforts be included in a model that is based on
neoclassical investment theory. Examples are imperfect capital markets where
interest rates for borrowing and for lending differ and time-variant economic
parameters like inflation, real interest rates, excess cash flows, or distributions
by the owner. Instead, models based on neoclassical investment theory build on
a consistent but unrealistic economic framework. The logical consistency of the
assumptions is ensured, but the results cannot be generalised arbitrarily.
Besides other issues, it might also be these inflexibilities that have led to the
widespread use of models based on neoclassical investment theory. In the spirit
of an ISO-norm46 the basic assumptions are immediately clear to the user; they
are the well-known assumptions of neoclassical investment theory. With model
firms, on the contrary, especially if they are implemented in huge computer pro-
                                                                                             
45 For the Devereux/ Griffith approach, see e.g. the tables by Schreiber/ Spengel/ Lammersen (2002),
pp. 8-10.
46 For a similar metaphor, see Schneider (1988), p. 291.
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grammes, the premises met are often not immediately clear. This can be over-
come by a careful documentation of the model and by a systematic analysis of
the impact of different economic assumptions on the results. Therefore, sensi-
tivity analyses and what-if-analyses are very useful. However, neither neoclas-
sical approaches nor model firm approaches can fully satisfy the claim to be
universally valid.
As model firm approaches transform the economic environment more carefully,
the tax consequences can also be implemented in more detail. Models based on
neoclassical investment theory cannot or only in extremely special cases deal
with progressive tax rates, loss compensation rules, the impact of taxation on
dividend constraints established by corporate law or tax rules that change over
time. This can be seen as a disadvantage, as these rules might have a strong im-
pact on the effective tax burden.
4.4 Usefulness of Measures with Respect to Economic Issues
4.4.1 Introduction
To further illuminate these issues, we will rely on a simple example comparing
two different but simple tax systems. An investor who faces a personal tax rate
on interest income of mi = 40 % and a real market interest rate of i = 5 % may
choose, e.g. by deciding on the location, between two tax regimes for a real in-
vestment which depreciates at  = 20 %: The first one represents a cash flow tax
with immediate depreciation (A = ) and a profit tax rate of  = 40 %. The sec-
ond one represents a corporate income tax with neutral depreciation of marginal
investments ( = ) and a profit tax rate of  = 25%. There are no further taxes
on dividends or personal capital gains. The investor finances the project by re-
taining earnings.
The upper half of figure 1 plots the impact of these tax regimes on the rates of
return.
The abscissa defines the considered investment by its pre-tax rate of return.
Supposing a downward-sloping marginal product of capital, as displayed by the
downward sloping line of the pre-tax rate of return p, the further to the right the
marginal investment is, the more investments are profitable.
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Figure 1: An Example of Rates of Return and Effective Tax Rates.
The ordinate contains the rates of return that are relevant for an investment that
generates the pre-tax rate of return denoted by the abscissa. First, this is again
the pre-tax rate of return p. Second, these are the two post-tax rates of return r40
and r25 an investment with a pre-tax rate of profitability of p would earn either
25
under the 40 %- or the 25 %-tax regime. Both lines are also downward sloping.
A more favourable depreciation regime induces an upward shift of the post-tax
rate of return, whereas the main effect of a lower tax rate is to increase the slope
of the r-lines. Thus r40 is flatter than r25 while starting off from a higher level at
p = 0. Third and fourth, the ordinate contains the real market interest rate i and
the marginal post-tax rate of return to the shareholder s. Both are independent of
the level of profitability and thus horizontal.
The lower half of figure 1 shows the effective tax rates (ETR) for each pre-tax
rate of return under the two tax regimes. In addition to the effective tax rates
based on rates of return ETRp, also those based on net present values ETRR are
plotted. These effective tax rates are only shown for the area where an invest-
ment is inframarginal or marginal, i.e., its post-tax rate of return r is at least as
high as the post-tax market rate of return to the investor s.
(a) Under the cash flow tax the cost of capital is 3 %. This implies an ETRp40 of
0 %. The ETRR40 is strongly negative, indicating that the post-tax net present
value of zero exceeds the pre-tax net present value of the investment, which
is negative, by large. As shown above, under these assumptions only the
ETRp equals the EMTR as calculated by the approaches of Devereux/ Griffith
and King/ Fullerton, which are the same under the assumptions taken here.
(b) For the income tax, the advantage given by the low tax rate of 25 % trans-
lates into a cost of capital of 4 %. Again, taxation raises the net present value
of the investment, and the ETRR25 is negative. However, one quarter of the
return on the investment is taken by taxation, thus the ETRp25, which equals
the EMTR, is 25 %.
(c) The third important level of the pre-tax rate of return is 8 %. At p = 8 %,
both tax systems result in a post-tax rate of return of 6 %. The investor
would be indifferent between both tax regimes. This is also displayed by
both concepts of the ETR, with ETRp40 = ETRp25 and ETRR40 = ETRR25. For
rates of return below p = 8 %, the cash flow tax system is advantageous, for
rates of return above, the income tax system is. This is due to the fact that the
higher the rate of return of an investment, the more important becomes the
statutory tax rate, and the relatively less important are the allowances which
are based on the fixed initial cost of the investment and thus work like a
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fixed payment by the government.47 This is exhibited by the effective tax
rates. The ETRp tends from the EMTR towards the statutory tax rate  for an
increasing level of profitability, whereas the EATRR tends towards a value
that is lower than the statutory tax rate due to the taxation of the alternative
use of funds.48 If dividends were taxed, the asymptotic value would also mir-
ror dividend taxation. For a given pre-tax rate of return (fixed-p-case), the
investor favours the investment with the lower ETR regardless of the meas-
ure.
(d) This leads us to finally focus on the so-called fixed-r-case for inframarginal
investments. To obtain a post-tax rate of return of 9 %, the investment has to
earn 12 % under the income tax regime and 13 % under the cash flow tax re-
gime. The comparable values under the fixed-r-case are different from those
under the fixed-p-case, but again the ETR of the unfavourable cash flow tax
regime is higher than the one of the income tax regime.
Bearing this example in mind, we can now explore the usefulness of these indi-
cators for different economic problems.
4.4.2 Decision-making
With respect to the investment decision, in economic theory the volume of
capital invested depends on the marginal rate of return. For a given downward
sloping investment schedule, the last unit invested has to earn the cost of capital
at least. The higher the cost of capital, the less investment is undertaken.
Indirectly, this can also be shown by the EMTR. An EMTR below the statutory
tax rate on interest income mi indicates overinvestment, an EMTR above this
rate indicates underinvestment. The statutory tax rate on interest income, which
is 40 % in the example, is thus the benchmark for economic distortions under
these assumptions. It also delivers a standard measure indicating whether the
definition of the tax base or a system of corporate taxation disadvantages an in-
vestment. Under some basic assumptions,49 the EMTR calculated from (4), (5)
and (19), i.e. following the Devereux/ Griffith approach, also fulfils the fourth
                                                                                             
47 For a more detailed investigation, see Devereux/ Griffith (1999), pp. 21-23; Schreiber/ Spengel/
Lammersen (2002), pp. 15-16.
48 See in detail Devereux/ Griffith (2002), p. 11; Schreiber/ Spengel/ Lammersen (2002), pp. 15-16.
49 These include the assumptions of the basic model above and a given tax rate on personal interest
income mi.
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proposition mentioned in section 3.3 in case of equity-financed investments. An
advantage given by a generous tax base or a favourable corporate tax system is
equal to a systematic variation of the statutory tax rate under a neutral definition
of the tax base and a neutral corporate tax system for the marginal investment.50
The tax systems mentioned above both lead to a distortion with respect to the
level of investment as the cost of capital in both cases is below the market inter-
est rate. Overinvestment is greater in the cash flow tax regime than in the in-
come tax system, causing a greater excess burden of taxation.51
For a business manager, the cost of capital shows the minimum rate of return an
additional investment has to earn.
Turning towards discrete investments, the EATR is the relevant measure of the
effective tax burden. The cost of capital is only relevant to prove whether at
least one of the alternatives offers a non-negative post-tax net present value,
which is the case if the investment's pre-tax rate of return is not below its cost of
capital.
For a fixed pre-tax rate of return, an investor chooses the investment with the
lowest EATR to obtain the greatest net present value or pre-tax rate of return.
For a given post-tax rate of return, different EATR indicate different pre-tax
rates of return that are necessary to obtain this post-tax rate of return. The
greater the positive or negative differences to the EATR of a given alternative,
the greater the potential economic distortions. To prove an economic ineffi-
ciency, only the fixed-r-case would be suited. Under the fixed-p-case, there
would be no inefficiency, as by definition each of the alternatives would be
similarly efficient. However, the fixed-p-case already gives strong evidence on
potential economic distortions. Different EATR remove the indifference that
would prevail if taxes were not considered, thus inefficiencies can be expected
already for slight differences in the pre-tax rates of return.
For the EATR, a standard measure for the effective tax rate is less important
than it is for the EMTR. The comparison to the tax treatment of a financial asset
is less meaningful, as a limited number of profitable alternatives should be
compared and one of them should be selected. The issue is not how much can
                                                                                             
50 See Schreiber/ Spengel/ Lammersen (2002), pp. 15-16.
51 The excess burden can be depicted exemplarily by the triangles in the upper half of figure 1 be-
tween the i-line, the p-line, and a vertical line at the intersection of the r and the s-line of the tax re-
gimes.
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be invested in a single alternative until the last unit invested earns the minimum
required return. Under equal non-tax parameters, the alternative which exhibits
the lowest EATR will exhibit the highest post-tax net present value and thus be
the most advantageous with respect to its tax treatment. However, by fulfilling
the properties mentioned in section 3.3, an EATR would be easier to communi-
cate and the tax drivers might be identified more easily. The EATRp fulfils these
properties under the same assumptions as mentioned above for the EMTR.
Empirically and theoretically, it has been shown that the EATR is very relevant
for international location decisions.52 Referring to the example in section 2.2.1,
if an investor expected post-tax economic rents of 4 (A), 7 (B), and 5 (C), the
investor would choose country B and there would be a welfare loss of 2 if
country A could not offer its economic rent to somebody else, i.e., if the eco-
nomic rent could only be exploited by country A and the particular investor to-
gether.
For a business manager, the fixed-r-case might also show some kind of hurdle
rate. If an investor had to weigh up a location which offers a higher pre-tax rate
of return and another one which offers a more favourable tax regime, he might
conclude on the size of the extra rate of return necessary to outweigh the more
favourable tax system. However, it is necessary to set a reference case, which
may be difficult to choose. The problem compared with a situation of marginal-
ity is that there is no natural benchmark when deciding between mutually exclu-
sive investments that earn an economic rent.
If the favourability of certain investments is assumed to depend not only on
rates of return or net present values, but also on liquidity and the availability of
funds, the EATRR might point at the impact of taxation on net present values and
thus the credit standing connected with an additional investment. Ceteris pari-
bus, net present values rise when generated net cash flows increase or when the
alternative use of funds is taxed more heavily. Thus measures based on net pre-
sent values can only be a proxy for a greater cash flow if the discount rate is not
affected. On the contrary, (1 – EATRp) might be a proxy for the net cash flow
generated by an additional profitable investment and thus the availability of in-
ternal sources of finance.
                                                                                             
52 See Devereux/ Griffith (1998), pp. 353, 362; Bond (2000), pp. 171-172; Devereux (2000), p. 113;
Richter/ Seitz/ Wiegard (1996), p. 19.
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However, it should be noted that the assumptions taken by the approaches based
on neoclassical investment theory are not consistent with liquidity effects of
taxation, as they suppose perfect capital markets with a single market interest
rate. Thus studies based on model firms might be more suited to evaluate these
issues. Here, liquidity effects can be implemented as a side condition or as a
part of the goal variables.
This idea is supported by the view that an enhanced liquidity rather depends on
an EATR in the sense of the effective tax burden on a whole business unit, as
opposed to the one on an additional investment.53 As model firm approaches
might consider whole business units, these approaches might capture such ef-
fects.
With respect to the impact of taxation on financing decisions, for most tax sys-
tems it appears to be sufficient to consider the marginal case. Usually, differ-
ences in taxation with respect to different sources of finance are caused by the
corporate tax system or by the definition of the taxable base. These differences
are fully mirrored in the cost of capital and the EMTR, as (4), (19), (23), and
(24) show. The tax-efficient source of finance for a marginal investment is thus
in principle54 always the tax-efficient source of finance of any profitable in-
vestment, regardless of the level of profitability.
From the point of view of a business manager, this information can be used for
tax optimisation schemes based on choosing the source of finance that offers the
lowest cost of capital.
From an economic point of view, differences in the cost of capital of different
sources of finance might identify desired or undesired distortions and the po-
tential whether there is at least one source of finance that is neutrally taxed and
thus may serve as a buffer which absorbs effects of taxation on real investment.
If one deems liquidity effects as more relevant for financing decisions than ef-
fects on profitability,55 the remarks on liquidity effects mentioned above also
apply to financing decisions.
                                                                                             
53 See Fazzari/ Hubbard/ Petersen (1988); Jacobs/ Spengel (1994), p. 200; Hubbard (1998), p. 219.
54 Deviations from this rule might e.g. occur if the profits from an investment that is financed by a
particular source of finance are taxed at a lower tax rate.
55 See e.g. Schneider (2002), p. 175.
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4.4.3 Competition
With respect to competition, we need to take an interpersonal point of view. If
we assume the selling price to be the parameter for competition, the effective
level of taxation might be an indicator of competitiveness inasmuch as the rate
of profitability is directly tied to the selling price. If the competitor with the
lowest potential price wins the competition for serving the market with the pro-
ceeds of one additional invested unit, the cost of capital can act as an indicator
for competition issues. The EMTR cannot be applied to explore the competi-
tiveness if individuals face different personal tax rates on interest payments.
This is the case because under high interest taxation coming with a high level of
company taxation, the EMTR might be high whereas the cost of capital might be
low.
Ceteris paribus, a company facing a cost of capital of 3 % might place a lower
bid than a company that faces a cost of capital of 4 %. Again, due to the ceteris
paribus assumption, one cannot draw a direct conclusion on whether a firm that
was less competitive before taxes were taken into account displaces a more
competitive one, causing a welfare loss.
If competitiveness is also affected by liquidity, effective average tax rates be-
come relevant. The issues mentioned in the previous subsection also hold true
here. The results from neoclassical approaches might be valuable indications
when carefully interpreted, and model firm approaches might be better suited in
this case than approaches based on neoclassical investment theory.
4.4.4 Distributional Aspects
To assess distributional issues, the usefulness of the indicators based on neo-
classical investment theory is very limited. We can only gather some first ten-
dencies by relying on these approaches.
Each of the investment, financing and competition issues mentioned above has
an impact on the relative income of the individuals who reap the fruit of the
projects, i.e., one has to allow for discretionary space for the investors to tax
optimise their behaviour. Then the EMTR and the EATRp might give an impres-
sion on the part of the proceeds from an extra unit of investment that is taken by
taxation.
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The EATRR displays the ranking of post-tax net present values. However, as net
present values strongly depend on the taxation of the marginal investor and thus
the alternative use of the funds, international comparisons for individuals with
different personal tax rates and thus different opportunity costs might be mis-
leading.
As already mentioned, net present values increase with lower opportunity costs
of investment. An increase in the personal tax rate on interest income of the
marginal shareholder thus boosts share values, even though the cash flows gen-
erated within each period might be exactly the same as before. If the share-
holder sells the share, he will be better off than before, but if he keeps it forever,
wealth increases only on paper, and the shareholder will not be any better off. A
tax system that puts an equivalent burden on the opportunity cost of an invest-
ment as on the investment itself56 would not change the present value of the in-
vestment, but the present value of taxes paid would obviously be positive.
Other limitations result from the fact that the models based on neoclassical in-
vestment theory only regard one factor and do not consider complex mecha-
nisms of tax incidence. Furthermore, they only consider additional investments,
not the tax burden on the whole income of an individual. Model firm ap-
proaches can take into account a number of additional relevant issues, e.g. per-
sonal allowances. They might therefore be better suited for the investigation of
distributional aspects.
5 Summary and Conclusions
Effective tax rates are a useful tool for economists, policy makers and business
managers who demand condensed but sophisticated information on effective tax
burdens. Business managers are generally interested in post-tax measures of
performance, while economists rather need to know the differences in pre-tax
measures, as these differences indicate distortions and welfare losses. However,
to predict the behaviour of economic agents, economists have to model the be-
haviour of managers. Thus they also have to consider post-tax performance.
The most important task of the measurement of effective tax burdens is to iden-
tify relative differences in tax burdens and the tax drivers that are responsible
                                                                                             
56 This is true for the tax system outlined by Johansson and Samuelson, see section 3.2.
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for them. For the identification of these tax drivers and for the communication
of the results, it is very helpful if the measure of the effective tax burden exhib-
its some properties that permit a comparison with the statutory tax rate under a
neutral tax system.
A number of different approaches for measuring effective tax burdens on capital
income exist. This variety helps solving a number of different economic issues.
However, not all approaches are equally suited for all problems. For the meas-
urement of forward-looking effective tax burdens, we first need to determine
whether the effective marginal or the effective average tax burden is the rele-
vant measure for the question to solve.
The effective marginal tax burden is relevant if investment projects are assumed
to be arbitrarily divisible and the investor can always invest the exact amount to
equalise the post-tax rates of return of all alternatives. Effective marginal tax
rates (EMTR) are suited to evaluate whether a tax system follows its systematic
foundations and to show allocation effects. Furthermore, they can be applied for
investigating tax effects on financing decisions. The cost of capital, which is
closely related to the concept of the marginal tax burden, can be employed when
analysing the effects of taxation on competitiveness.
The effective average tax burden is relevant if there is a choice of a number of
profitable, mutually exclusive projects. A classic example for this situation is
the choice of location. Under a number of limitations, effective average tax rates
(EATR) can also be relevant for liquidity aspects and distributional aspects of
taxation. Relative differences in the EATR are more important than their abso-
lute values.
The elements of the tax base and the tax rate enter the results of EMTR and
EATR with different weights: For the EMTR, tax rules with respect to the defi-
nition of the tax base are more important than for the EATR as long as they are
based on the initial cost of the asset and not on the level of profitability. The
same would be true for other tax rules that are tied to the initial cost of an in-
vestment, e.g. wealth or property taxes based on historic costs. For the EATR
the statutory tax rate, which is also important for the EMTR, is more important.
Thus both measures might lead to different results when applied to the same tax
system or issue. A meaningful measurement of effective tax burdens therefore
supposes that the purpose of the measurement and thus the basic question to be
solved is revealed.
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Once it is clear which of the two measures should be calculated, a second step
should consider the theoretical approach. We can differentiate between models
based on neoclassical investment theory (King/ Fullerton and De-
vereux/ Griffith) and approaches based on model firms. The former have been
preferred in economics, the latter in business management. However, both con-
cepts have common roots. Models based on neoclassical investment theory can
be regarded as special cases of model firm approaches under very strong as-
sumptions.
The approaches by King/ Fullerton and Devereux/ Griffith differ in details. The
latter should be preferred in case the EATR should be calculated in addition to
the EMTR. By computing an EATR based on rates of return, the consistency
between effective marginal and effective average tax rates can be secured.
In case only EATR are of interest, model firm approaches are the more prefer-
able, the more detailed the economic framework and the tax system need to be
modelled.
Figure 2 finally depicts this choice.
Measurement of 
Effective Tax Rates 
(Forward-Looking) 
Effective Marginal Tax Burden 
Effective Average Tax Burden Model Firm Approach 
Approaches based on 
neoclassical investment 
theory 
King/ Fullerton 
Devereux/ Griffith 
Measure Approach 
Figure 2: Measures and Approaches for the Calculation of Forward-looking 
Effective Tax Rates.
Appendix
To show the conditions for an equivalence between the King/ Fullerton and the
Devereux/ Griffith approach, it is sufficient to show the equality between the
cost of capital calculated under both approaches. This is because the expression
for the post-tax rate of return for the shareholder s is the same in both models.
We find some general cases57 where both approaches yield the same numerical
results for the EMTR:
Case 1: The investment is financed with retained earnings.
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Case 2a: Neutral corporate income tax system with mi = , md = c, and z = 0.
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Case 2b: Debt financing and equal tax rates on corporate profits and personal
interest payments (mi = ), no capital gains taxes. This can be regarded as a spe-
cial case of case 2a, as for debt-financed marginal investments the taxation of
dividends is irrelevant.
 = DKF ; F = 0  
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Case 3: Non-neutral corporate tax system, but neutral depreciation for tax pur-
poses ( = ). In this case, only the distortions caused by the corporate tax sys-
tem remain. For debt financing, there is no such distortion in the basic model.
New equity: )1()1(
)1()1(~~


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i
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Debt: ipp KFDG  ~~ . (29)
                                                                                             
57 There are more cases which are less general, i.e. need more common parameter specifications, but
where both approaches in principle obtain the same results, e.g. the case of a cash flow tax with A = ,
md = mi = z = 0 and non-deductibility of interest payments at the corporate level. This would result in
ipp KFDG  ~~ .
References
Baker & McKenzie (eds.) (2001), The Effective Tax Burden of Companies in the Member States of
the EU - The Perspective of a Multinational Investor, Amsterdam.
Bond, Stephen R. (2000), Levelling Up or Levelling Down? Some Reflections on the ACE and CBIT
Proposals, and the Future of the Corporate Tax Base, in: Cnossen, Sijbren (ed.), Taxing Capital In-
come in the European Union, pp. 161-179.
Bond, Stephen R./ Chennells, Lucy (2000), Corporate Income Taxes and Investment: A Comparative
Study, London.
Caron & Stevens/ Baker & McKenzie (eds.) (1999), Survey of the Effective Tax Burden in the Euro-
pean Union, Amsterdam.
Chennells, Lucy/ Griffith, Rachel (1997), Taxing Profits in a Changing World, London.
Claassen, Frank (1994), Steuerbelastung internationaler Investitionen, Hamburg.
Devereux, Michael P. (2000), Issues in the Taxation of Income from Foreign Portfolio and Direct
Investment, in: Cnossen, Sijbren (ed.), Taxing Capital Income in the European Union, pp. 110-134.
Devereux, Michael P./ Griffith, Rachel (1998), Taxes and the Location of Production: Evidence from
a Panel of US Multinationals, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 68, pp. 335-367.
Devereux, Michael P./ Griffith, Rachel (1999), The Taxation of Discrete Investment Choices – Revi-
sion 2, IFS Working Paper Series No. W98/16, London.
Devereux, Michael P./ Griffith, Rachel (2002), Evaluating Tax Policy for Location Decisions, CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 3247, London.
Devereux, Michael P./ Lammersen, Lothar/ Spengel, Christoph (2000), The Effective Levels of Com-
pany Taxation in the Member States of the EU, Warwick.
European Commission (ed.) (1992), Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company
Taxation, Luxembourg.
European Commission (2001), Company Taxation in the Internal Market, {COM(2001)582 final},
Brussels.
Fazzari, Steven/ Hubbard, R. Glenn/ Petersen, Bruce (1988), Investment, Financing Decisions, and
Tax Policy, American Economic Review, vol. 78 (2), pp. 200-205.
Fullerton, Don/ Metcalf, Gilbert E. (2002), Tax Incidence, NBER Working Paper 8829, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Georgi, Andreas A. (1994), Steuern in der Investitionsplanung – Eine Analyse der Entscheidungsrele-
vanz von Ertrag- und Substanzsteuern, 2nd ed., Hamburg.
Gutekunst, Gerd/ Schwager, Robert (2002), Steuerbelastung von Unternehmen im Alpenraum, Baden-
Baden.
Hållsten, Bertil (1966), Investment and Financing Decisions, Stockholm.
Herzig, Norbert/ Dempfle, Urs (2002), Konzernsteuerquote, betriebliche Steuerpolitik und Steuer-
wettbewerb, Der Betrieb, vol. 55, pp. 1-8.
Hubbard, R. Glenn (1998), Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment, Journal of Economic Lit-
erature, vol. 36, pp. 193-225.
Hugounenq, Réjane/ Le Cacheux, Jacques/ Madiès, Thierry (1999), Diversité des fiscalités européen-
nes et risques de concurrence fiscale, Revue de l’OFCE, vol. 70, pp. 63-109.
Jacobs, Otto H./ Spengel, Christoph (1994), Aspekte der Unternehmensbesteuerung im internationa-
len Vergleich, in: Dichtl, Erwin (ed.): Standort Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Frankfurt a. M, pp. 193-
229.
Jacobs, Otto H./ Spengel, Christoph (1996), European Tax Analyzer, Baden-Baden.
Jacobs, Otto H./ Spengel, Christoph (2000), Measurement and Development of the Effective Tax
Burden of Companies – An Overview and International Comparison, Intertax, vol. 28, pp. 334-351.
Jacobs, Otto H./ Spengel, Christoph (2002), Effective Tax Burden of Companies in Europe – Current
Situation, Past Developments and Simulation of Reforms, Heidelberg.
Johansson, Sven-Erik (1961), Skatt, investering, värdering, Stockholm.
Johansson, Sven-Erik (1969), Income Taxes and Investment Decisions, Swedish Journal of Econom-
ics, vol. 71., pp. 104-110.
King, Mervyn A./ Fullerton, Don (eds.) (1984), The Taxation of Income from Capital, Chicago/ Lon-
don.
Lammersen, Lothar (1999), Die zinsbereinigte Einkommen- und Gewinnsteuer – Ökonomische Ana-
lyse eines aktuellen Reformvorschlages, Nuremberg.
Maiterth, Ralf (2001), Wettbewerbsneutralität der Besteuerung, Bielefeld.
Markusen, James R. (1995), The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory of Interna-
tional Trade, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9 (2), pp. 169-189.
OECD (1991), Taxing Profits in a Global Economy: Domestic and International Issues, Paris.
OECD (2000), Tax Burdens: Alternative Measures, OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 2, Paris.
OECD (2001), Tax Ratios: A Critical Survey, OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 5, Paris.
Richter, Wolfram F./ Seitz, Helmut/ Wiegard, Wolfgang (1996), Steuern und unternehmensbezogene
Staatsausgaben als Standortfaktoren, in: Horst Siebert (ed.), Steuerpolitik und Standortqualität, Tü-
bingen, pp. 13-47.
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (Council of Eco-
nomic Experts in Germany) (2001), Für Stetigkeit – gegen Aktionismus, Jahresgutachten 2001/02,
Stuttgart.
Samuelson, Paul A. (1964), Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant Valua-
tions, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 72, pp. 604-606.
Schreiber, Ulrich/ Spengel, Christoph/ Lammersen, Lothar (2002), Measuring the Impact of Taxation
on Investment and Financing Decisions, Schmalenbach Business Review, vol. 54, pp. 2-23.
Schneider, Dieter (1988), Wider leichtfertige Steuerbelastungsvergleiche, Die Wirtschaftsprüfung,
vol. 41, pp. 281-291.
Schneider, Dieter (1992), Investition, Finanzierung und Besteuerung, 7th ed., Wiesbaden.
Schneider, Dieter (2002), Steuerlast und Steuerwirkung, Munich/ Vienna.
Scott, M. FG. (1987): A Note on King and Fullerton’s Formulae to Estimate the Taxation of Income
from Capital, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 34, pp. 253-264.
Sinn, Hans-Werner (1987), Capital Income Taxation and Resource Allocation, Amsterdam.
Spengel, Christoph (1995), Europäische Steuerbelastungsvergleiche: Deutschland – Frankreich –
Großbritannien, Düsseldorf.
Spengel, Christoph (1999), Effective Marginal Tax Rates for US Investors in Germany and Europe –
An Analysis of Recent Tax Reforms in Germany, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 99-55, Mannheim.
Spengel, Christoph/ Lammersen, Lothar (2001), Methoden zur Messung und zum Vergleich von inter-
nationalen Steuerbelastungen, Steuer und Wirtschaft, vol. 78, pp. 222-238.
Stellpflug, Thomas (2001), Die Besteuerung von Kapitalgesellschaften und ihren Anteilseignern: Eine
investitionstheoretische Analyse, Wiesbaden.
Weichenrieder, Alfons J. (1995), Besteuerung und Direktinvestition, Tübingen.
Winner, Hannes (2000), Unternehmensbesteuerung in Europa, Baden-Baden/ Vienna.
